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Service-Dominant Logic and Licensing in International B2B 
Markets  
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Abstract: This paper asks whether the service - dominant logic is superior to the 
traditional goods - dominant logic for the use of licensing to commercialize new 
technologies internationally – and why so. To answer this question two case of 
licensing float glass, a float glass manufacturing technology and Benecol, a process to 
manufacture cholesterol lowering ingredient for food, are examined and contrasted. 
The findings indicate that the service – dominant logic yields advantages. Licensing 
logic for success in technology transfer is suggested. 
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Introduction 
This paper asks whether managers (firms) applying the good-dominated logic (G-D-
logic) or service - dominated logic (S-D logic) may impact license success in the effort 
to commercialize a new technology (innovation). This question is important because 
licensing is frequently applied in the effort to commercialize new technology and 
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because licensing often fails. Here it is believed that insights to this question may 
enhance firms’ probability to succeed in their licensing effort.   
To benefit from new technologies they must be commercialized, which either directly 
or indirectly implies contacts with potential customers to conduct - hopefully beneficial 
transactions. Contact with customers (the market) may – in principal be obtained in 
several ways, by straight direct sales, own distribution channels - or through distribution 
channels owned by others. However, options such as direct sales or building own 
distribution channels in many cases prove to be inherently expensive. Moreover 
distribution through other often prove to give too limited control and influence on sales of 
own technology, as well as too limited protection and appropriability to earn form the 
property rights embedded in the new technology. In such cases licensing may be the only 
relevant solution.     
A license is a contractual deal. Contracts imply some future aspects, as what 
agreed upon will take place in the future, depending on whether the contracting parties 
fulfill their promises. However, most contracts are incomplete. “Contracts are 
incomplete for several reasons. First due to uncertainty related to the future, due to the 
existence of a large number of contingencies, it may be prohibitly costly to know and 
specify in advance to all of these possibilities. Second, particular contractual 
performance, such as level of energy an employee devotes to complete a task, may 
be very costly to measure….” (Klein 1980). Thus, knowledge requirements and costs 
associated with measuring the contractual performance often prohibit complete 
contracts. From this it is evident that international licensing deals raise both 
informational and motivational challenges.  
Licensing as a contractual technology transfer mechanism is surprisingly little 
empirically researched (Kollmer and Dowling 2004). The purpose of this article is to 
examine whether the logic underlying an established license may influence its success 
or failure.  
Underlying the way of doing business there is some logic, i.e. way of thinking 
influencing acting – either implicitly or explicitly. Vargo and Lusch (2008) identified key 
characteristics of logic underlying the traditional ways of doing business and 
marketing, where the seller is the point of departure with the focus is on “what is 
beneficial for me” (the sellers) which they labeled “good –dominant logic” (G-D logic). 
In the G-D logic goods are seen as the unit of exchange. The focus is from seller’s 
perspective, i.e. on selling products. In a series of works they (Vargo and Lusch) have 
addressed the need to change from the traditional G-D logic to what they term service 
- dominant (S-D) logic.  
In the S-D logic the focus is on value creation of both buyer and seller. Both parties 
are assumed to be involved and benefit. This means that the contracted party in a 
licensing deal has to be treated as an equal and valuable partner in their joint value 
creation. Such a shift in perspective is believed to influence flow of information, mode 
of interactions, motivation and willingness/ability to see joint interests, and work for the 
same goals. To explore the impact of both logics in international licensing agreements, 
we describe and contrast two cases of licensing agreements, a successful one and a 
failure. The two cases are float glass, a flat glass manufacturing process and Benecol, 
the process to manufacture cholesterol lowering ingredient for different types of food 
                                                                       Service-Dominant Logic and Licensing in International B2B Markets 
    
 267 
such as yoghurt, margarine, milk etc. Implications for international licensing 
agreements and launching of new technologies are highlighted.  
The remaining part of the paper has four sections. First, we clarify central concepts 
and describe theoretical elements and assumptions underlying this research. After 
this, we report on our research methodology. Then, the two licensing cases are 
described, followed by analysis and comparison of the two cases by using key 
characteristics derived from the research literature as basis for the comparison. At last 
we draw conclusions and discuss implications. 
 
Central Concepts and Theoretical Inputs 
In this section we discuss the central concepts and theoretical ideas underlining the 
paper, i.e. licensing, service dominant logic (Vargo Lusch 2004, 2008a, 2008b), as 
well as formal and informal co-operation (Håkansson and Johanson 1988). 
Licensing 
In this paper licensing constitutes the mode of external technology exploitation (Fosfuri 
2006; Mottner and Johnson 2000). Licensing transactions can be made due to several 
reasons (Fosfuri 2006). Technology licensing may provide monetary and strategic 
benefits. The monetary benefits refer to generating licensing revenues (Davis and 
Harrison 2001). There are usually three ways for the licensor to get licensing 
revenues: 1) a lump sum, 2) royalty based on sales of volume and 3) the raw material 
sold to the licensee. The two latter ones are realized only if the licensed technology will 
be proven to create value to the licensee or its customers (Teece 1992). Moreover, raw 
material supply usually creates financial risks since the licensor has to build a production 
plant. If the licensed product is not selling the financial risks of the licensor are realized as the 
burden of both investment cost and at least fixed operation costs. The strategic benefits 
from technology licensing seem to be equal important (Arora et al. 2001). The licensor 
tries to improve his/her competitive position, which indirectly affects its financial 
performance (Lichtenthaler 2007a, 2007b). The central aspect in licensing is the 
agreement which specifies rights and obligations. A successful license requires that 
the both licensor and licensee have the needed knowledge and motivation to do the 
best for their common interests. This also requires that they have the needed 
knowledge about what to expect and able to specify the needed requirements. 
(Grønhaug et. al. 1999). 
Service-dominant-logic 
Marketing traditionally focus on operand resources that are goods as the unit of 
exchange. The purpose of economic activity in the goods-dominant logic focuses as 
on making and distributing saleable products. Value is created during the processes of 
production and distribution. Firms try to maximize profit from the sale of standardized 
and individually produced goods which can be inventoried before sale. (Vargo and 
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Lusch 2004)  The service-logic in contrast implies that marketing is a combination of 
social and economic processes that focus on operant resources. The company 
identifies its core competences, the fundamental skills to represent potential 
competitive advantage. It also tries to identify other entities benefiting from these 
competences. A central point in the S-D logic is that the company takes care of 
customer relationships.  According to Vargo and Lusch (2008a, 2008b) there is need 
for marketing to shift the unit of analysis from products to value creation. They also 
claim that it is essential to realize that drivers for all value creation are operant 
resources capable for acting on other players’ resources. Table 1 shows key 
characteristics of goods- and service – dominant logic, respectively.  
 
 
 Goods Dominant Logic Service-Dominant Logic 
 Goods Service(s) 
 Tangible Intangible 
 Operand Resources Operant Resources 
 Asymmetric Information Symmetric Information 
 Propaganda Conversation 
 Value Added Value Proposition 
 Transactional Relational 
 Profit Maximization Financial Feedback 
Table 1: Contrasting the goods and service-dominant logics (Lusch et al. 2006, p. 268) 
 
 
Inspection of Table 1 reveals great differences between the two logics, and these 
differences in thinking are believed to impact on actions. First, in the G-D logic the 
emphasis is on tangible goods, while in the S-D logic it is on service and intangible 
aspects. Further, in the G-D logic sellers’ and buyers’ information is asymmetric, while 
symmetric in the S-D logic, i.e. sellers and buyers are equal. Also the S-D logic 
emphases relations between sellers and buyers, i.e. both parties (sellers and buyers) 
must benefit, which is a prerequisite for relationships to last. This is in contrast to the 
focus on the individual transactions as reflected in the G-D logic. 
 
Table 2 further distinguishes most of the differences characterizing the two logics.  
 
 
 
                                                                       Service-Dominant Logic and Licensing in International B2B Markets 
    
 269 
 Goods logic Service logic  
      Making something Assisting customers in their own  
           (goods or services)  value creation processes  
 Value as produced                                        Value as co-created   
      Customers as isolated entities Customers in context of their  
          own networks   
      Customers as targets  Customers as resources   
       Primacy of efficiency Efficiency through effectiveness 
Table 2: Transition for practitioners (Vargo and Lusch 2008a, p. 258) 
 
 
Inspection of Table 2 reveals several important changes in practitioners thinking 
and doing from being in charge of making to assisting, when moving form G-D logic to 
the S-D logic. For example, such a change in logic implies a change from seeing 
customers in isolation to capture them in their own context, and also a change from 
seeing customers as targets to seeing them as resources. 
Changes in thinking and action from moving from G-D logic to S-D logic, including 
the process of using ones resources for the benefit to another party, has been dealt 
with several research constructions. For example, in a special issue of this journal 
(Journal of Business Market Management, 2010, vol 4) Vargo and Lusch (2010) used 
insight to re-conceptualize and enlighten the concept of relationship, and Chandler and 
Wieland (2010) examined implications for networks, innovations and ecosystems, 
while Löbler (2010) examined the coordination between services and relationships by 
applying the S-D logic. Moreover, Lusch et al. (2010) used the insight to supply chain 
management.   
 
Formal and informal cooperation strategies in international industrial networks 
Informal cooperation is based on trust developed through social exchange. This can 
be attained only over time where the parties experience that the other party is 
trustable. In informal cooperation business comes first and visibility later - if it comes - 
whereas in formal cooperation, visibility comes first and business later - if trust can be 
developed. Formal cooperation does not always lead to real cooperation, and real 
cooperation is often not visible. Informal cooperation is developed by those who are 
directly involved in the business exchanges between companies, such as line 
managers at the middle organization level. Formal cooperation, on the contrary, is 
usually established at higher management level with higher. (Håkansson and 
Johanson 1988). In formal cooperation the parties are interested in illustrating the 
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presence or intended presence for the counterpart. The messages of formal 
cooperation can also be directed at competitors ("this market is nothing for you"), 
suppliers ("supply us; we are the leaders") or suppliers of complementary products 
("our system are worth developing"). Similar remarks can be intended for other 
stakeholders. Informal cooperation is used when the parties are interested in business 
with the counterpart's network without visibility, which may prevent potential moves by 
competitors. Companies with a strong position usually use formal cooperation while 
companies with less strong position seek informal cooperation. 
 
Research Methodology 
 
This section reports on the research methodology chosen to examine our research 
problem empirically. Due to the exploratory character of our research problem, and 
because the research problem needs to be examined in its context (as a license does 
not take place in vacuum) a case study approach (Yin, 2009) was chosen. More 
precisely, this approach was chosen because in order to examine our research 
problem empirically, detailed data about the license, partners involved, the handling of 
the license, outcomes and influencing factors are needed.     
 
Here we reconstructed the events and their unfolding over time in order to capture 
the processual aspects of the process technology transfer (see Menard 1991). Patton 
(1990) also argues that "qualitative inquiry” is highly appropriate in studying processes 
because depicting a process requires detailed description”. Porter (1980) also claims 
that in an industry analysis it is important to get an overview of the industry first, and 
then focusing on the specifics. A broad understanding can help the researcher to spot 
important data when studying sources and organize data more effectively as they are 
collected. The study includes two cases, i.e. a case study of a successful licensing and 
one case study an unsuccessful licensing agreement. 
The two cases selected for this study are very different. Float glass is a British 
innovations and targeted flat glass manufacturers. Benecol is a Finnish innovation and 
it is an ingredient used in food stuff and represents health constituent of foodstuff used 
so called functional foods. The target customers are food manufacturers all over the 
world.  
The case descriptions reported in section 4 are based on interviews, news 
clippings from Finnish and international business magazines and newspapers (1960-
2005) as well as on other sources such as company newsletters and published 
material of Benecol provided by Raisio Group as Jick (1979) suggested. The writing 
and the use of the cases also enhance deeper understanding of the phenomena and 
industries.  
To capture the meaning of the collected data we applied content analysis to 
identify core consistencies and meanings (Kolbe and Burnett 1991, Patton 2002, 
Weber 1990, Patton 2002). Content analysis of annual reports and other published 
material has several advantages. The data in content analysis are unobtrusive, 
reliable, and may eliminate some of the biases such as sensemaking and selective 
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memory (Bowman 1984). Moreover top management in fact put a lot of effort into what 
the firm communicates through such reports increasing the reliability of the data 
(Bowman 1984). An important point is also that such data is often available for 
researchers. The access to data also enables reproducibility, which strengthens 
reliability (Weber 1990).  
Besides writing and using the two cases, several conference papers and articles 
have been written based on the cases (e.g. Uusitalo 2009, Uusitalo and Grønhaug 
2006 and Uusitalo and Mikkola 2010). 
 
The Licensing Cases 
 
In this section we report the cases, the float glass from Pilkington (UK) and the 
Benecol case for Raisio (Finland). The large US market as a target is common for both 
of them.  
Pilkington and Float Glass in the US flat glass industry 
 
The plate glass industry was characterized by high quality and high price products and 
large capital-intensive investments. In the early 1930s the European and the US plate 
glass manufacturers shared the world markets. The market outside the U.S. was 
divided so that the U.S. producers could take 20 percent and the European producers 
the remaining (Barker 1977, p. 361). To make plate, molten glass was rolled into a 
plate with a waffled surface and then ground and polished until both surfaces were 
smooth and parallel. In 1923 Pilkington from the UK together with Ford Motor Co. 
(later on Ford) installed the industry's first continuous plate manufacturing process. In 
1937 Pilkington introduced a `twin' machine to grind both sides of a plate glass ribbon 
simultaneously. Twin grinding gave Pilkington a technological advantage in plate glass 
manufacturing. The twin grinding technology was first licensed in 1937 to the leading 
continental manufacturer, the St. Gobain (Barker 1977, p. 189) and in the 1950s other 
European and US manufacturers (Barker 1994, p. 79). 
In the 1950’s in a seven year project Pilkington developed a new flat glass 
manufacturing process, a float glass, to replace the plate glass process. In the float 
glass process, a continuous ribbon of glass moves out of the melting furnace and 
floats along the surface of an enclosed bath of molten tin. The ribbon is held in a 
chemically controlled atmosphere at a high enough temperature for a long enough 
time for (the irregularities to melt out and) the surfaces to become flat and parallel. 
Because the surface of the molten tin is dead flat, the glass also becomes flat. As a 
result of this process it became possible to make thinner flat glass of high quality while 
eliminating the grinding and polishing steps required in the plate glass process. The 
float process was estimated to be ten times more efficient than the old grinding and 
polishing technique (The Glass Industry, July 1981, p. 16). In the late 1950s the 
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company gradually introduced float glass with the help of its partner into safety glass. 
The process was launched in 1959 as a total surprise to the industry 
Pilkington weighted carefully the possibilities of exploitation of float glass. Soon the 
company rejected keeping the process for itself forever. It also rejected keeping the 
secret for just a few years to increase its market share. By keeping the invention, 
Pilkington thought, invited retaliation from other manufacturers and pressed by 
competition, might come up with an even more dramatic process. Furthermore, 
Pilkington had no the financial resources to produce all the float glass for the world 
market demand. (Wierzynski 1968). 
Float glass was licensed worldwide in the 1960s and 1970s. At the beginning 
Pilkington granted licenses strictly only to plate glass manufacturers with specific 
terms for cross licensing (see Appendix). In 1960 Pilkington told US manufacturers, 
Pittsburg Plate Glass (PPG) and Libbey Owens Ford (LOF), them being licensee 
candidates. According to Pilkington's licensing policy the first licensee should not 
operate a second plant until the second licensee had , in his turn, had an opportunity 
of  operating his first plant (Skeddle 1977). PPG delivered Pilkington float glass 
products to selected mirror, glazing and automotive customers, to seek feedback from 
them. GM’s feedback was important. PPG estimated that an initial 10 percent 
reduction in prices for float glass relative to plate glass prices would be a sufficient 
inducement for GM to adopt float glass. PPG did not ask comments from Ford since 
Ford could have considered taking a license from Pilkington for the float glass process 
itself. LOF decided to construct their first float glass unit in California. This signaled, of 
course, the willingness of GM to accept float glass for all their automotive products. 
(Skeddle 1977). 
In 1962-1974 Pilkington sold six float glass licenses to the US. The technology 
transfer involved intensive training. The production team of a licensee comprised 
almost 20 people and they spent at least four weeks in Pilkington plant with the 
Pilkington team of the same size. For Pilkington it was crucial that a good relationship 
between the teams of a licensee. The company encouraged social entertainment. The 
visit lasted from four weeks to 12 weeks depending on the case. Grundy (1990).  
 
Iley (1984, p. 53) reported the success of licensing operation of Pilkington as 
follows:  
 
 “To date [1983], 31 licensees from around the world have taken licenses. 
Pilkington takes particular pride and satisfaction in the fact that, in every case, staff of 
the licensee has been trained on a Pilkington plant and every start-up has been 
successful.” Iley (1984, p. 53) 
 
In the 1960s the US window glass producers competed with imported window 
glass. Producers invested in window glass plants since float glass was neither suitable 
the window glass use nor available for them. In 1970 Guardian, outside the flat glass 
industry, built its a float plant without any license. Pilkington reached the licensing 
agreement in 1971 with Guardian not to loose royalty income (Uusitalo, 1995). Later 
on, complementary innovations (Teece 1986), such process automation, computer 
based quality control, the process control and the mechanical engineering increased 
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the effectiveness (thinner, tinted glass with lower costs) of the float glass process.  The 
development of the US market is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
1965  1970 1975 1980Year
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
SHEET
FLOAT
PLATE
 
 
Fig. 1: Flat glass production in the US, 1964-1980 (Edge 1984) 
 
 
Inspection of Figure 1 reveals that over time float glass became dominant design in 
the flat glass industry. 
Benecol and the global food industry 
 
The term functional food leads to think of a food with a specific function or effect. The 
product may vary both in shape and in specific function, but the desired outcome is a 
scientifically justified medical effect. The effect may be a preventive one, which delays 
or altogether impedes the onset or further development of a disease, or even a curing 
one. The last effect, curing one, makes the distinctions between food and medicine 
blurred. If functional foods are seen as food products, they are also expected to 
appear food-like and have a pleasant taste. If functional foods are seen as proactive 
medicines, they may assume medicine-like shape and taste (Mark-Herbert 2002). 
The cholesterol-lowering effect of plant sterols was known as early as the 1950s, 
and since that time scientists all over the world have studied plant sterols and their 
properties. The process for extraction of sitosterol, raw material for the sitostanol ester, 
was created at a Finnish university in the 1970s. In 1980 a Finnish pulp mill started to 
produce sitosterol That time it was known that plant stanols were the most effective 
and safe of the plant sterols in reducing serum cholesterol. However, nobody knew 
how to use plant stanols in foodstuffs.  
In the mid 1980s a manager from a Finnish pulp asked a couple of professors 
whether they had any use for sitosterol, a by product of the pulp mill. Professor, Tatu 
Miettinen, who had done extensive research on fat metabolism, studied a sample of 
sitosterol as the sitostanol ester. The problem was how to dissolve sitostanol in oil or 
fat. First he suggested research on plant sterols and stanols to the largest Finnish 
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dairy company, which, however, turned down the idea. Miettinen was convinced his 
ideas were right and he did not give up. He then turned to the Raisio Group (later on 
Raisio) and to R&D Manager, Ingmar Wester from Raisio's Margarine Subdivision. In 
1989 Raisio develop a manufacturing process to turn plant sterol into fat-soluble stanol 
ester suitable for food production. A patent application was filed in 1991. In 1993 after 
four years the manufacturing process was developed.  
The findings of a three years clinical stanol ester study were published in the New 
England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) in 1995. Raisio introduced the first product, 
Benecol margarine, on the Finnish market in 1995. Soon expectations both in Finland 
and internationally grew. The Times wrote about Mr Wester as "the man whose pot of 
gold could save millions of lives". The limited production capacity of the raw material 
was a restricting factor. In 1996 Raisio could satisfy only two thirds of the demand in 
Finland. In 1996 stock analysts valued the Benecol patents to almost $2 billion and 
Raisio’s stock price sky-rocketed (see Figure 2). 
In April 1997 Raisio’s top management was overwhelmed with offers varying from 
the big boys operating worldwide to shopkeepers in Nigeria. They were in doubt about 
whose offer they may accept. Rather than choosing one global giant, they were more 
likely to name several partners. The CEO of Raisio said: "One giant global partner 
would not get Benecol out with maximum speed, [but] the No. 2s in individual markets 
may be more hungry to take this interesting innovation forward" “(Echikson 1997)”. 
International press followed Raisio and Benecol very intensively (Brännback 2003).  
Figure 2 shows stock prices and related events for the period 1995-2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: The events relating to Raisio Benecol and Raisio’s stock price in 1995-2001. 
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In 1997-98, Raisio signed a agreement with the US McNeil Consumer Products 
Company, a part of the Johnson & Johnson group (the world's biggest and most 
versatile producer of health-related products with a turnover of $22 billion in 1996 and 
170 operative companies in 50 countries) first for North America and then world wide. 
McNeil had the sole right to use the Benecol trademark and patents on the global 
markets. McNeil aimed to introduce the first products in 1998. Raisio kept the entire 
production of raw material in its own hands and developed the Benecol production and 
marketing in Finland and neighboring areas.  
Raisio’s business model of licensing Benecol included 1) a modest lump sum, 2) 
royalty and 3) the revenue of the sold ingredient. In 1998-1999 Raisio built plants in 
Finland, Chile and the US to supply enough raw material. Naturally Mc Neal’s 
expectations were as high as those of Raisio, thus only an exclusive agreement was 
good enough (and possible). Global marketing took place by a strong and skilful 
partner. McNeil introduced the first products in spring 1999, one year later than 
planned (Uusitalo, 2000). 
 
Comparison of the two licensing strategies 
 
From the above description it is evident that float glass became the core competence 
for Pilkington. It was a breakthrough, revolutionary, discontinuous and competence 
destroying innovation (Anderson and Tushman 1990, Quinn 1989 and Utterback 1994) 
making the existing plate glass technologies obsolete (see Figure 1). Thus, float glass 
became an operant resource for Pilkington indeed. The float glass technology was at 
the beginning effective only in the plate glass industry. In this industry Pilkington made 
test marketing of float glass as the raw material for safety glass to a partner company. 
This testing involved the process of listening, aligning, and matching (Vargo and Lusch 
2004). Float glass was too thick and too expensive, thus not effective at all, in the 
sheet glass industry. As mentioned in the case description in the 1960s and the 1970s 
the effectiveness of float glass was improved by complementary technologies, such as 
process automation (Teece 1986, 2006).  
Pilkington had experience of licensing both as a licensee (licensing sheet glass 
drawn process from PPG in the 1930s) and licensor (in the 1950s the twin grinding 
technology for the plate glass manufacturing in the US) to the flat glass industry and 
thus knew the industry well. In Teece and Pisano’s (1994) words float glass “stems 
from dynamic capabilities rooted in high performance routines operating inside the 
firm, embedded in the firm's processes, and conditioned by its history." The 
commercialization (the licensing) of float glass technology involved a lot of other 
manufacturers first from the plate glass industry and later on from other industries. The 
float license allowed the licensee to lower its production costs. Pilkington charged a 
lump sum and royalties. Licensing of the complementary process technologies also 
involved extensive training and later on the updating of technology plus training related 
to the improved technologies. This was the case with float glass, as well.  
Because of the oligopolistic structure of especially the plate glass industry both in 
the US and Europe the float glass licensing operations required well managed 
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relationship between the licensor and a licensee. Licensees in the US represented to 
the licensor, Pilkington, core competences (complementary asset, Teece 1986) 
organized to gain competitive advantage in manufacturing and selling (thus providing 
licensing income to the licensor) plate glass and sheet glass in the US. In order to 
serve the licensees and their customers Pilkington’s intention was to have a smooth 
and quick start of each new line licensed. Because of that Pilkington created service-
centered marketing which was customer-centric and market driven (Day 1999). For 
instance all Pilkington employees from engineers down to the workmen in contact with 
customers (licensees) were service oriented marketing people (Grundy 1990). In 1964 
Mr. Grundy, the foreman responsible for licensees site, spent 12 weeks with the 
licensee during the start up of first licensed line. In marketing (licensing) the value, the 
well functioning (24/7) manufacturing process with lower manufacturing costs, was 
defined by the licensees and the value was also later on co-created through cross 
licensing (see Appendix). Pilkington built both on informal and formal co-operation 
(Håkansson and Johanson 1988). Pilkington’s licensing policy focused especially to 
maximize the number of friends and minimize the number of enemies. 
As shown in the case description the development for Benecol was very different. 
The position of float glass in the plate glass industry was clear from the beginning, 
while Benecol was regarded as a functional food getting a lot of public attention. The 
positioning of Benecol products in between food and medicine as functional food was 
blurry, and thus it was very challenging. The demand of float glass came from the 
value chain (safety glass and car manufacturers) while in Raisio’s case the demand 
came implicitly from the consumers via stock analysts. Raisio was not as international 
as Pilkington was. Pilkington new the industry (the flat glass and safety glass) very 
well because of earlier licensing and its presence on the global market while Raisio 
had very little knowledge about the global food business.  
Maybe the NIH (not invented here) episode in the 1980s had slight impact on 
Raisio’s actions. Prof. Miettinen, the idea generator of Benecol, offered first 
unsuccessfully the research on plant sterols and stanols to the largest diary company 
in Finland. The company turned the idea down.  Raisio was Prof. Miettinen’s second 
choice.  Raisio’s management might have become a bit arrogant and thought that we 
will show the Finnish competitor (and also other industry participants) that they could 
commercialized Benecol alone world wide. This meant that local dairy or food 
companies were not able to license Benecol from Raisio and ruled out local informal 
cooperation.  
Benecol and Raisio’s stock price made a unique combination. Here the stock price 
of Raisio was directly and solely based on the expectations1 of the Benecol innovation 
(see Figure 2). After the scientific article reporting a clinical test in Finland was 
published, the stock price took its first jump. The press followed each move of Raisio’s 
Benecol and stock analysts made their conclusion based on that. Moreover, the 
marketing in Finland started well. The product was sold out in 1995 in several Finnish 
stores. However, the Raisio’s press releases or articles by journalists had little 
information on the real use of functional food for instance in then main market, the US. 
                                                
1 We compared Raisio's high expectations in 1996 to real events in 2005 as follows: the half, $1 billion, of 
the potential sales value of the  patents in 1996, was 200 times the profit of the Benecol business in 2005. 
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The patents were valued to almost $2 billion. Perhaps all these positive events and 
rising stock price (see Figure 2) created a slight arrogant attitude to Raisio.  
The company “knew” the value of Benecol. In the early 1997 Raisio’s management 
and after the North American licensing agreement with McNeil in autumn 1997 at least 
Raisio (probably also McNeil) regarded Benecol as a dominant design (Anderson and 
Tushman 1990) in the functional food segment. Raisio’s licensing model backs this 
conclusion. They trusted blindly on one partner serving the whole globe and took both 
sales and financial risks. There are cases when licensees have bought exclusive 
licenses to block the product from the market.  
However, functional food was totally new market between food and medicines. 
Nobody knew whether consumers would like these products (within margarine, milk, 
yoghurt or should the functional food have good taste etc.) and accept them. This and 
the global food (and pharmacy) industry was totally unknown to Raisio. Still Raisio 
began licensing negotiations with many large partners to "conquer the US and the 
world market quickly". High expectations misled the parties to see their position as a 
monopoly. Raisio also started co-operation with a sole partner. Raisio counted on tight 
and formal co-operation. It also tried to get everything immediately, and tried to create 
a world wide monopoly with Johnson and Johnson (McNeil’s parent company) to sell 
Benecol. 
Raisio’s licensing model of had two consequences. First, this model implied both 
the sales risk of new products and the financial risk of the built plants for 
manufacturing the ingredient. Raisio’s investment in manufacturing also constrained its 
market responsiveness (Vargo and Lusch 2004), since in order to pay back the plants 
Raisio had to sell a lot of ingredient. Thus, Raisio’s licensing model concentrated on 
sales of the product, the ingredient to the sole licensee and not the services to 
licensee’s customers or partners. With this licensing model Raisio gave away all the 
positive aspects of licensing i.e. 1) to collect market information, 2) to create and 
conduct customer relationships, and 3) to offer service for the users of Benecol to the 
licensee, McNeil. Raisio’s only contact to the market was via the licensee. Very often 
licensees control tightly the flow of market information to the licensor. This was the 
case also within Raisio’s and McNeil co-operation. Raisio received little market 
information form its licensee. In the licensing negotiations the true knowledge from the 
market i.e. how much (if any) and in what form consumers use / eat functional food 
was forgotten. Thus, Raisio lacked important knowledge of the field. There is a long 
way from an article in a scientific journal to the knowledge of consumer behavior.  
Table 3 contrasts the licensing strategies of the two companies. Raisio had to sell 
product, ingredient, in order to fulfill the expectations and to finance the production 
plant investments while Pilkington created services to its industrial partners. In the 
1960s for instance the thickness of float glass was reduced form 6.5 mm to 2 mm 
provided further applications for flat glass manufacturers. This also made it possible 
for float glass to enter sheet glass market where all the existing US licensees also 
operated. Raisio had tangible product, ingredient and all end products were created by 
the customers of licensees. Raisio had no possibilities to sell services. Pilkington in 
contrast sold tangible services by installing float glass lines and updating the existing 
float glass technology.  
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 Raisio / Benecol (goods)   Pilkington / float glass (service) 
 products; licensing revenue service  
 tangible (raw material; business model) intangible (service, updated technology)
  
  expectations  float glass / dominant design,  
  competence destroying  
 monopoly, believed everybody needs  dialog; well known industry   
 one partner delivering  
 formal co-operation 
 value added value proposition  
 transactional (products)  relational (cross licensing; complementary         
assets) 
Table 3: The comparison of the licensing cases  
 
 
Raisio believed in outside expectations while Pilkington learned form real test 
marketing. Raisio more or less liked to create a monopoly (almost every consumer 
needs cholesterol lowering food) and trusted asymmetric information (seller sells) 
while Pilkington had a dialog within the industry it knew so well. Pilkington had also 
considered carefully the consequences of different type of commercialization modes 
(direct export, own plant in the US and licensing) in the US market. The quick 
capitalization of Benecol led Raisio to choose one huge (25 times larger that Raisio 
itself) and versatile (high level of R&D and global) partner while Pilkington licensed to 
all local actors in the US plate glass industry. Raisio used formal cooperation with 1) 
negotiation on top, 2) high publicity without any sales, 3) no free flow market 
information and 4) little activities on the lower organizational levels. Pilkington had 
extensive training and tests with its licensees involving people from all organizational 
levels. This has features such as 1) co-operation of operational and labor levels of 
organization and 2) informal flow of information from the informal co-operation. Raisio 
had transactional relationship with the product sales while Pilkington relational 
relationships with cross-licensing.  
Based on our analysis of Table 3 we conclude that Raisio followed the goods 
dominant logic while Pilkington behaved according to the service dominant logic.  
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Discussion 
 
Above we have reported on two licensing agreements. As shown the licenses were 
implemented and managed very differently. More precisely in the Pilkington case the 
licensor knew well the industry and also could anticipate the potential consequences of 
the innovation. Eventually Pilkington licensed float technology (Barker, 1994). Lord 
Harry Pilkington, the chairman of Pilkington, described certain key aspects of the 
resulting strategy as follows:  
 
"We had the great benefit of time to decide upon the strategy (the development of 
float glass took seven years). A great deal was said about ethics: that it was not our 
job to deliberately deny any existing glass competitor the opportunity of living in 
competition with us. I don't think we were shortsighted or rapacious... There was a 
great deal of investment worldwide in plate (glass), and people needed to have time to 
write off this plant or convert over. The alternative was chaotic disruption of a great 
industry." (in Quinn, 1977:13): 
 
Ethical concerns were also seriously taken into account. This meant that Pilkington 
would be a service company providing licenses. In the Benecol case there were high 
expectations on the innovation. The expectations were visible in the stock price of the 
company. Totally new matters, such as high expectations, a new functional food 
segment and global market potential made the situation for Raisio challenging. The 
question was how to exploit Benecol.  
As addressed above building on tight formal co-operation and restricting the use of 
complementary resources as apparently Raisio did with Benecol, is very difficult to 
pursue success as clearly demonstrated in Figure 2. Cooperation was created at the 
top management level. The lower lever people, such as product managers from Raisio 
did not know McNeil salesmen. A US salesman could easily change the product he 
sells if the status of the product (FDA approval for Benecol) is pending. It was also 
easy for them to deal with familiar product managers within their own organization. 
More over the licensor McNeal and its parent company Johnson & Johnson was well 
known for its R&D.  Very easily NIH (not invented here) syndrome may affect the 
dealing of the Benecol. Finally Benecol did not achieve a sustainable position in the 
US markets. Raisio and McNeal apparently generalized Raisio’s good marketing 
experience from Finland to the US (and worldwide) and overlooked the dramatic 
differences in the situations and contexts. In Finland the Benecol margarine moved via 
central wholesalers to consumers as normal foodstuff while in the US it was sold as 
health related products.  
The formal agreement prevented communication between parties to become a 
process characterized by dialogue, asking and answering questions. (Vargo and 
Lusch 2004)  The message to stakeholders was: do not bother; this is our business. 
McNeil had a sole right to use the Benecol trademark and patents in the US. When the 
agreement was signed stock analysts made another "market research". Because of 
the good results of the second "market research" the stock price of Raisio sky-
rocketed again. However, still nothing was known about the consumer behavior and 
not a single Benecol product was sold in the US.  
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In 1997 the US antitrust authorities approved the co-operation between Raisio and 
McNeil, but FDA’s reaction was still unknown. In a formal co-operation the top 
management gives the orders of the co-operation to the lower organizational levels, 
which might have lead to organizational problems. If the co-operation given by the top 
management does not work (in the Benecol case no permission from the FDA or not 
enough demand) already at the beginning hungry and short term oriented US 
salespersons tend to switch to other products of McNeil.  
The main purpose of this article has been to examine whether the idea of service-
dominant and product- dominant logics may contribute for explain success and failure 
in licensing. The Benecol case was a failure while the float glass case was a success. 
As we saw from the comparison of the cases (Table 3) learning, collaboration, flow of 
information and joint understanding of the market are very important in successful 
licensing. Raisio operated mainly in the domestic market. It had no experience in the 
global food business. High expectations (derived directly from the stock price of 
Raisio) of the Benecol created the licensing logic based on high sales of ingredient for 
Raisio. This should be handled neatly with one transaction only by a world wide 
exclusive license. However, the licensee must be have a global presence and thus, be 
a large firm compared to Raisio. Large firms also have objectives also in their licensing 
agreement and thus, they are tough negotiators. This lead to that Raisio was equipped 
(invested in plants) to sell goods, the customer (the licensee) was isolated (no contact 
to licensee’s customers), the contract was formal and tight (no market information, no 
learning of the industry). This reflects an underlying goods – dominant logic.  
Pilkington on the contrary was an international company. It knew the industry (both 
flat glass and safety glass) very well and started to co-operate with their existing 
competitors and licensees. Pilkington was a family owned company and had no 
pressure from the stock market. They carefully taught about the licensing services they 
offer. They co-created value with the licensees. They saw the licensees (customers) in 
context (safety glass manufacturing and the car industry) of their own networks. Based 
on our case analyses service dominant logic may better than goods dominant logic 
promote successful licensing implying:  
 
- assist customers in their own value creation processes; use lead users, give 
training 
- use cross-licensing, share co-specialized complementary assets 
- look customers in context of their own networks 
- be technology wise one step ahead of your competitors 
 
The change in perspective from G-D logic to S-D logic may be compared with 
Lewitt’s (1960) seminal distinction between selling and marketing. According to Lewitt 
selling focuses on the needs of the seller while marketing on the needs of the buyer. 
Selling is preoccupied with the seller's need to convert the product into cash, 
marketing with the idea of satisfying the needs of the customer by means of the 
product and the whole cluster of things associated with creating, delivering, and, 
finally, consuming it. 
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Appendix 
Pilkington licensing policy (Wierzynski 1968, pp. 122-3) 
“Pilkington decided to place limitations on the number and scope of licenses that it 
would grant. Licenses would go only to existing fiat-glass manufacturers, and under 
the license each would be free to convert only its existing plate capacity to float. If a 
plate-glass maker wanted to build new plants in countries where it did not previously 
manufacture, it would have to negotiate separate agreements. Furthermore, a 
licensee's export rights were limited to areas where the company had traditionally 
exported. Pilkington thus preserved the competitive status quo, while fencing off for 
itself areas of the World where the growing demand from auto makers and builders 
might soon make a float plant economical. Canada is already a case in point. While 
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Ford produces more than enough Float glass in the U.S. to equip its Canadian-built 
cars, it can export only a small portion of its surplus to Canada, since Canada is not 
one of its established export markets. Ford's Canadian automotive plants must buy 
glass from the $30-million float plant completed by Pilkington in Scarborough, Ontario, 
last year. 
 All licenses run for sixteen years. During the life of the license, Pilkington 
passes on to its licensees all the improvements it makes in the process — whether 
patentable or not. The licensees in turn inform Pilkington of all the improvements they 
make. Pilkington distributes to all licensees the nonpatentable improvements it 
receives, but keeps for itself the patentable innovations. Each licensee, however, is 
free to sell to other licensees its patentable improvements. 
 It is an ingenious arrangement. The free exchange of know-how among 
licensees and licensor enhances the value of the patent and makes Pilkington richer. 
The right of each licensee to sell its patentable improvements to others is a powerful 
spur to further development. And the provision that only Pilkington receives all the 
inventions made by others ensures that the company will lie technically ahead of its 
competitors when the licenses run out; it will be the only company to have received all 
the research done on float. Also, by encouraging licensees to conduct research on 
float, Pilkington is diverting their resources from work on a rival process. The licensees 
have already patented about ninety inventions; Ford, for example, has developed a 
special graphite lining for the float bath, designed to maintain thermal homogeneity in 
the molten tin.” 
 
 
